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DePARATA v. DePARATA
The Present Validity Of Alabama "Consent" Divorces
Gherardi DeParata v. Gherardi De Parata1
Defendant husband flew to Birmingham, Alabama and
during a period of several hours signed a complaint for
divorce and an affidavit which recited he was "a bona fide
resident of the State of Alabama and had been such for
the period required by law."2 Defendant tendered to the
Alabama lawyer representing him a paper entitled, "An
Acceptance of Service of process and Answer and Waiver
of Respondent" signed by the plaintiff's wife and also a
letter signed by her, addressed to another Alabama lawyer,
authorizing him to file the "waiver" in her behalf. The
purpose of these written documents was for wife to waive
the right to contest the issue of her husband's domicile in
Alabama. On the basis of these pleadings an Alabama
divorce decree was mailed to husband and he then notified
his wife that they were divorced. Plaintiff wife brought
this action in the form of a bill to affirm the marriage and
to nullify the allegedly fraudulent divorce obtained by
husband in Alabama.' The lower court found that wife
knew of and consented to the proposed divorce proceedings.
It then held that while the proceedings in Alabama ap-
peared on their face to be irregular, her consent and the
fact that she appeared by counsel and interposed no ob-jection to the lack of jurisdiction or took no appeal from
the decree in Alabama, rendered the court without power
to give her relief under the full faith and credit clause of
the Federal Constitution. The Municipal Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in reversing the lower court
reasoned: "Here there was not such actual appearance and
participation by the wife as to justify recognition of the
decree which followed. The rule announced in Sherrer and
Coe does not require it and we hold for lack of jurisdiction
over the res, or over either of the parties, the Alabama
decree is subject to challenge in this jurisdiction."4
In theory, as far as federal law is concerned, the divorce
decree of an American state is entitled to full faith and
credit only if the divorcing state had jurisdiction over the
marriage res by virtue of being the domicile of at least one
1179 A. 2d 723 (D.C. 1962).
2Id., 724; Code of Ala., Tit. 34, § 29 (as amended) provides: "When the
defendant is a nonresident, the other party to the marriage must have
been a bona fide resident of this state for one year next before the filing
of the bill, which must be alleged in the bill and proved; provided how-
ever, the provisions of this section shall be be of force and effect when
the court has jurisdiction of both parties to the cause. of action."
8 See D.C. Code (1961) § 16-422. Which authorizes such a suit.
'179 A. 2d 723, 725 (D.C. 1962).
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of the parties. 5 Domicile is then the basis for jurisdiction
in divorce law. Consequently a marriage can only come
under the jurisdiction of a particular state court by reason
of one of the parties being domiciled within the geograph-
ical jurisdiction of that court.6 The two parties to a mar-
riage cannot, by coming voluntarily before a court, thus
confer this necessary jurisdiction over their marriage res.7
Williams v. North Carolina III was decided in 1945 and
in the approximately 18 years since then,9 the law of inter-
state divorce has been debated, examined, appealed, and
generally confused. ° The essential holding of the case, that
when a divorce decree of a foreign state is collaterally
attacked the examining state has a free hand to determine
whether or not the acting party in an ex parte proceeding
was domiciled in the state granting the divorce so as to
give that court jurisdiction over the marriage res, remains
as the starting point of any discussion in this area of the
law." The Supreme Court has qualified and examined the
area several times since then, 2 but the most important
qualification and the one with which these Alabama de-
crees are most closely connected is contained in Sherrer v.
Sherrer5 and its companion case of Coe v. Coe.14 These two
cases as a unit rendered immune from such collateral at-
tacks those divorce decrees where "there has been partici-
pation by the defendant in the divorce proceedings, and
where the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to
'GOODRICH, CONFUCT OF LAWS, (3d ed. 1949) 395.
6Maryland Is in accord with these principles. See 'Gregg v. Gregg,
220 Md. 578, 155 A. 2d 500 (1959); Brewster v. Brewster, 204 Md. 501,
105 A. 2d 232 (1954); Epstein v. Epstein, 193 Md. 164, 66 A. 2d 381
(1949) ; and materials cited therein.
7Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236, 237, 3 A.L.R. 2d
662 (1948). There the COurt said, "Jurisdiction, which is the judicial
power to grant a divorce, is founded on domicile under our system of
law. * * * it is recognized that unless one of the parties has a resident
or domicile within the state, the parties cannot even by consent confer
Jurisdiction on the courts of that state to grant a divorce." For a critical
discussion of domicile see 30 St. Johns L.R. 270 (1950).
8325 U.S. 226 (1945).
OFor an excellent discussion of Interstate Divorce up to and including
the first Williams case, see Strahorn and Reiblich, The Haddock Case
Overruled - The Future of Inter8tate Divorce, 7 Md. L. Rev. 29 (1942).
10 See generally, Baer, The Law of Divorce Fifteen Year8 after Williams
v. North Carolina, 36 N.C. L. Rev. 265 (1958), and materials cited therein.
11 Maryland has followed the case, Gregg v. Gregg, 220 Md. 578, 155
A. 2d 500 (1959).
1See generally, Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956); Cook v.
Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951);
Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949) ; Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948) ;
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U.S.
279 (1945).
1"334 U.S. 343 (1948), noted 11 Md. L. Rev. 143 (1950).
14 334 U.S. 378 (1948), noted 11 Md. L. Rev. 143 (1950).
360
DePARATA v. DePARATA
contest the jurisdictional issues...."- Dean Griswold in
his article16 on divorce jurisdiction has interpreted the
cases to hold that:
"[WIhere the absent spouse participates in the divorce
proceedings by appearance (which may be through an
attorney), by filing an answer, or by otherwise taking
part, the divorce which is granted is binding and effec-
tive, and must be recognized in other states. This is
not a determination that the court had jurisdiction to
grant the divorce; it depends rather upon a rule that
the participating spouse is precluded by res judicata.
M,17
Generally the concept of res judicata is now the accepted
interpretation of the Sherrer and Coe cases." The problem
is one of determining how far the principle is applicable
and under what circumstances. The key to this determina-
tion seems to lie in the meaning of the word "participation"
as used by the Supreme Court. Clearly if there is no par-
ticipation or appearance by the defendant in the foreign
divorce proceeding the doctrine of res judicata is not appli-
cable. 9 Most state courts speak of a sufficient amount of
participation and look for such things as personal appear-
ance by the defendant,20 signing a power of attorney
whereby defendant was represented by a counsel of his
21own choosing, or personal service within the divorcing
court's geographical jurisdiction even without a later per-
sonal appearance.22 The underlying noiion in all of these
decisions,2" as to what constitutes a requisite amount of
participation seems to be that if the participation by the
party defendant puts him in a procedural position to con-
test the jurisdictional fact, then in a collateral attack he
is precluded by the res judicata principle of the Sherrer
"Supra, n. 13, 351.
Grisw1old, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition .o1 Divorce Decrees -
A Comparative Study, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1951).1 Id., 216.
8See, Note, Res Judicata and Interstate Divorce, 11 Md. L. Rev. 143
(1950); Note, Development in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev.
818 (1952).
"This was the circumstance in Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S.
226 (1945). There the party defendant to the divorce proceeding in
Nevada did not even know of the divorce proceeding and had only been
brought before the Nevada court by means of a substituted service prbcess.
10Nappe v. Nappe, 0 N.J. 337, 120 A. 2d 31 (1956).
Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 158 A. 2d 508 (1960).
0 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
See 28 A.L.R. 2d 1303 (1953), for a comprehensive annotation of the
whole area and idea of "participation."
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case from raising the issue again.24 The general consensus
of these decisions is that in most of the Alabama "consent"
decrees, at least in theory, there is the requisite amount of
participation merely in the uncoerced granting of a power
of attorney. Presuming therefore that most of these Ala-
bama "consent" decrees would pass an "amount of partici-
pation" test and that in the instant Parata case there was
such a requisite amount of participation by the wife,25 why
did the court rule the way it did? The Parata court seemed
to be moving towards a distinction, which, while not im-
pinging the res judicata rule of Sherrer and Coe, does add
a qualification or additional test. The language of the
Sherrer case itself gave the first clue when the Court sug-
gested the type or kind of participation necessary - "where
the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to con-
test the jurisdictional issues .... ,21 This seems to mean
that there must be the requisite amount of participation
and it must be of the right type or kind. Simply stated,
the Parata Court seems to be adding a "type or kind of
participation" test to what we have already seen might be
called an "amount of participation" test. The real ground-
work for this reasoning appears first in Staedler v. Staed-
ler,27 which was decided close on the heels of the Sherrer
case. There the New Jersey Supreme Court limited the
application of the Sherrer case to "a true adversary pro-
ceeding where the parties are represented by counsel of
their independent choice and where there is opportunity
to make a voluntary decision on the question as to whether
or not the case should be fully litigated either on the
question of jurisdiction or the merits.... - In general
this is not the kind or type of participation present in the
Alabama "consent" decree. The effect of the signing of a
power of attorney in the Parata case was merely for a
lawyer to present to the court the wife's waiver of the
right to contest the jurisdictional issue - it certainly was
not what would be called the appointing of a lawyer to
represent a client in a true adversary proceeding. In the
Parata case the sole purpose of the wife's participation
See Bozeman, The Supreme Court and Migratory Divorce: A Re-exam-
ination of an Old Problem, 37 A.B.A.J. 107 (1951) and Paulsen, Divorce
Jurisdiction by Consent of the Parties - Developments Since Sherrer v.
Sherrer, 26 Ind. L.J. 380 (1951).
2 The presumption may be premature in the Parata case because 'f due
process requirements, as mentioned on p. 726 of the decision, but the
court does not seem to rest its decision on this point, so it seems fair to
take the presumption that her acts were sufficient, at least in amount, to
result in "participation."
'334 U.S. 343, 351 (1948).
6 N.J. 380, 78 A. 2d 896, 28 A.L.R. 2d 1291 (1951).
Idh., 902.
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was for her to waive domicile requirements for her hus-
band so, in effect, a fraud could be perpetrated on the
Alabama court. If then the purpose and effect of the requi-
site amount of participation is only to put the defendant
before the court with the clear intention of thus avoiding
the domicile requirements and not for the purpose of con-
testing or having the opportunity to contest the issue of
jurisdiction, then the Parata court seems to be saying that
the res judicata principle of the Sherrer case should not
be applicable to preclude collateral attack even though
there well may have been the requisite amount of partici-
pation. The Parata case and the recent cases29 affirmatively
citing it seem to be taking this narrower approach to the
Sherrer rule, first enunciated in the Staedler case, and
using it to impeach the extraterritorial validity of these
Alabama "consent" decrees."°
There is a further factor which creates widespread spec-
ulation concerning the validity of these Alabama "consent"
decrees. Chief Justice Vinson's majority opinion in the
Sherrer case contains the following statement; the doctrine
is limited to cases "where the decree is not susceptible to
such collateral attack in the courts of the State which
rendered the decree."' 31 Hartigan v. Hartigan32 has rendered
such Alabama "consent" decrees susceptible to a collateral
attack in Alabama, though the extent of the decision is still
somewhat in doubt. 3 The basic holding of the Hartigan
case is that a divorce decree could be vacated on the court's
own motion after discovery of fraudulently alleged domi-
cile. No matter how construed, the case casts ominous
doubts on the validity of these consent decrees when tested
either in Alabama or elsewhere.3 4
The combination of a narrow application of the Sherrer
rule of res judicata by adding a "type and kind of partici-
pation" test as an instrument to prevent fraud on courts
by parties who have not met domicile requirements, and
Pelle v. Pelle, 229 Md. 160, 165, 182 A. 2d 37 (1962) and Guerieri v.
Guerleri, 75 N. J. Super. 541, 183 A. 2d 499, 502 (1962).
0 Maryland has affirmatively cited the Staedler case and those other
state courts adopting a narrower application of the Sherrer and Coe resjudicata principle: Colby v. Colby, 217 Md. 35, 42, 141 A. 2d 506 (1958)
cert. den., Appleby v. Colby, 358 U.S. 838 (1958).
81334 U.S. 343, 351 (1948).
n 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961).
0Reese, Alabama Divorces, Prac. Law, March, 1961, pp. 78, 83; Ross
and Crawford, Gresham's Law of Domestic Relations: The Alabama Quickle,
27 Brooklyn L. Rev. 224 (1961).
"Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725, 733 (1961). There
the Court said: "Not only is it conclusive that the 1954 divorce decree was
void for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter in Alabama, but it is
not entitled to full faith and credit in other jurisdictions."
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the factor of possible attack in Alabama itself when a court
there is presented with evidence of fraud as to alleged
domicile, leaves considerable legal doubt as to the validity
of these Alabama consent decrees if later attacked by a
dissatisfied party. There remains however, the equitable
consideration of the problem.
The effect of judgments in sister states rendering these
Alabama consent decrees void could, often times, be ex-
tremely harsh. If parties have remarried in reliance on
these consent decrees and have had children, such sister
state decrees voiding a consent divorce decree renders in-
nocent parties guilty of bigamy and their children illegi-
timate. There is also the possibility that parties, not in
good faith, may be given the opportunity to have a second
day in court and to have these Alabama decrees overturned
simply because it is now obvious that greater pecuniary
benefits can be obtained. However, these equitable con-
siderations are inconclusive in argument against the Parata
case and cases following its narrow approach. This is so
because a court faced with such equitable considerations
can use the familiar equity notions of unclean hands3 5 or
laches to work an equitable estoppel on the party collater-
ally attacking the divorce.36 In a proper case these equita-
ble principles can be used to balance the legal result ob-
tained under the narrow approach of the Parata case so
that decisions are not extremely harsh on parties who have
relied on consent decrees in good faith.
In conclusion, it is desirable that the courts follow the
lead of the Parata case in restrictively applying the Sherrer
rule as to res judicata. This combination of a narrowed
application of Sherrer and liberal use of equitable estoppel
will, in an appropriate case, harmonize the two conflicting
underlying policy considerations in this area of the law;
namely, that full faith and credit37 be given to sister state
decrees, but that such decrees not be used to conflict with
or overturn the fundamental social and public policy of an
individual state.38
JOHN HARits GURLEY
15See for application in this area, McClanahan v. McClanahan, 79 Ohio
App. 231, 72 N.E. 2d 798 (1946).
See generally for an excellent discussion of this area: Clark, Estoppel
Against Jurisdictional Attack on Decrees o1 Divorce, 70 Yale L.J. 45 (1960).
" Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584 (1951). There the court said:
"The full faith and' credit given is not to be niggardly but generous, full."
'5Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945). There the
court said: "[T]hose not parties to a litigation ought not to be foreclosed
by the interested actions of others; especially not a State which is con-
cerned with the vindication of its own social policy.. . " Also see, Slanky
v. State, 192 Md. 94, 63 A. 2d 599 (1949).
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